Third, the United States so far has found only one effective tool against guerrilla forces that strike from difficult terrain: overwhelming air power. U.S. commanders still must think how to deploy ground forces and helicopters in order to minimize losses and ensure success on the ground. The current situation -- in which relatively small, diversionary groups of militants are killed while a major force escapes air strikes and emerges in other areas to strike again -- cannot be considered success.

Finally, the U.S. war against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan is turning into a war by the United States, its Western allies and local collaborators against various forces that are united behind one goal: to get rid of foreign occupation. The Taliban is just a part of this emerging anti-foreign consensus. This bears a striking resemblance to Afghan unity against Soviet occupiers backed by weak collaborators. A very dangerous indicator of this trend is evident in Operation Anaconda: Hundreds of local tribesmen and some Pushtuns from Pakistan moved to help Taliban guerrillas once the U.S. troops arrived in Paktia.

Additional analysis from STRATFOR.com can be found at http://www.stratfor.com. This article is reprinted with permission from the publisher.