From the U.S. point of view, Turkey's entry into Iraq serves two purposes. First, it supports a U.S. attack on Iraq. Second, it creates a presence inside Iraq that, down the road, could influence events in Baghdad or serve as a counterweight to Iran if and when it starts encroaching on Iraqi territory. In other words, Turkey fits into U.S. strategic needs on many levels. In the long run, even if Iraq collapses, Turkey might serve as a counterweight to the Iranians in the Persian Gulf.

This is the fundamental difference between Germany and Turkey: geography. The geography of the current era's main issues makes Germany peripheral. It makes Turkey central. Inevitably, U.S. and German interests will diverge, while U.S. and Turkish interests will continue the convergence that has been in place for more than half a century.

There is no way to paper over the divergence of U.S. and German geopolitical interests, no matter how many Prague conferences are called. Obviously, in the case of Turkey there are divergent geopolitical interests. Its physical security requires a relationship with the United States; its economic security requires a relationship with Europe. Thus, Turkey might get caught in a squeeze.