The biggest reason most of the Taliban fighters will likely disappear again is that local Pushtuns do not cooperate with the United States: Pro-U.S. troops consist of Pushtuns from the neighboring provinces of Logar and Khost, but many locals favor the Taliban. Indeed, a majority of anti-U.S. forces in the region are locals themselves, including their commander-in-chief, Rahman.
What lessons and implications can be drawn from Operation Anaconda?
First, there is no end to the war in Afghanistan -- or of U.S. involvement there -- on the horizon. STRATFOR has long said that Taliban fighters would regroup and launch a long guerrilla war. This is what is happening now. The guerrilla action is being led mostly by local Afghans rather than foreign militants and thus is especially dangerous. This tactic also creates favorable conditions for foreign Islamic radicals, including al Qaeda, to continue to use the country for sanctuary and training purposes despite the fact that a pro-U.S. group holds power in Kabul. For this reason U.S. ground and air forces are unlikely to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. More operations like Anaconda and more guerrilla attacks lie ahead. Although the United States and its allies likely will be able to hold major cities, they will find it difficult or impossible to control much of the countryside.
Second, Operation Anaconda shows that local U.S. allies are relatively weak and lack sufficient will to contain guerrilla forces -- even with extensive air support -- let alone defeat them. Thus the United States will have to send more ground troops to Afghanistan, signaling longer and heavier U.S. involvement in this war. That in turn may affect Washington's plans to fight terrorism in other parts of the world.
What lessons and implications can be drawn from Operation Anaconda?
First, there is no end to the war in Afghanistan -- or of U.S. involvement there -- on the horizon. STRATFOR has long said that Taliban fighters would regroup and launch a long guerrilla war. This is what is happening now. The guerrilla action is being led mostly by local Afghans rather than foreign militants and thus is especially dangerous. This tactic also creates favorable conditions for foreign Islamic radicals, including al Qaeda, to continue to use the country for sanctuary and training purposes despite the fact that a pro-U.S. group holds power in Kabul. For this reason U.S. ground and air forces are unlikely to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. More operations like Anaconda and more guerrilla attacks lie ahead. Although the United States and its allies likely will be able to hold major cities, they will find it difficult or impossible to control much of the countryside.
Second, Operation Anaconda shows that local U.S. allies are relatively weak and lack sufficient will to contain guerrilla forces -- even with extensive air support -- let alone defeat them. Thus the United States will have to send more ground troops to Afghanistan, signaling longer and heavier U.S. involvement in this war. That in turn may affect Washington's plans to fight terrorism in other parts of the world.