massive share of the world's oil production. Saudi Arabia itself understood that it would be Baghdad's next victim. The Saudis therefore permitted a massive deployment of U.S. forces into the country, which brings us to our current situation in which Saudi-U.S. interests are no longer in alignment.

First, the secular-radical Arabist movements are in practical terms a thing of the past. Odd remnants remain here and there, but they are no longer the dynamic force driving the region's politics. Second, Iraq is a well-contained entity. The

Iraq-Iran balance has been reasserted, as Iranian power has grown throughout the 1990s. Iraq no longer poses a threat to the Saudis.

Finally, Arab radicalism has been replaced by Islamic radicalism, and the representation of that movement has passed from Riyadh's Shiite enemies to a variety of Islam native to Saudi Arabia. The United States has lost its Soviet adversary. It has, however, encountered a new strategic enemy: the same radical Islam that is part of the fabric of Saudi Arabian society.

Washington expects Saudi Arabia to remain aligned with the United States as it has been since the 1950s. But this is an unreasonable expectation. The United States has as its strategic goal the defeat of al Qaeda, and in order to accomplish this, it must undermine radical Islamists. As part of its strategy, Washington intends to strike at any country that supports al Qaeda, including Iraq.

The Saudis have no interest in becoming involved in a war with Iraq and less of an interest in becoming an integral part of a U.S. war on radical Islam. The goal of the Saudi royal family is to survive and prosper.