Surely by now, it is a widely accepted principle that where sensitive issues need to be decided, such as the selection of inspection targets, the Director General must be expected to exercise his judgement independently and free of any undue influence. There should be little argument that such decisions ought to be made under quasi-judicial conditions.
In addition to the selection of targets for inspection, there are many other instances in the Convention where the Director General is required to make decisions on sensitive issues. For example, he may be required to determine whether a given factual situation raises doubts or uncertainties as to compliance whether they are serious enough to warrant informing the Executive Council[1]. In the same vein, in the event that inspectors encounter resistance to their efforts to inspect particular items, the Director General could be called upon to decide whether or not to instruct them to insist on proceeding with the inspections.
The US sometimes gives the impression that it views the Director General and the Secretariat as existing solely for the purpose of providing support staff for the Executive Council and the Conference. Providing support staff, no doubt, is their primary role. But they have an important secondary role – one in which they are expected to act in a quasi-judicial manner. When functioning in that role, the Director General and his staff should be expected to act independently and free from any attempts being made to influence their decisions, except when made under conditions of open dialogue or due process.
In addition to the selection of targets for inspection, there are many other instances in the Convention where the Director General is required to make decisions on sensitive issues. For example, he may be required to determine whether a given factual situation raises doubts or uncertainties as to compliance whether they are serious enough to warrant informing the Executive Council[1]. In the same vein, in the event that inspectors encounter resistance to their efforts to inspect particular items, the Director General could be called upon to decide whether or not to instruct them to insist on proceeding with the inspections.
The US sometimes gives the impression that it views the Director General and the Secretariat as existing solely for the purpose of providing support staff for the Executive Council and the Conference. Providing support staff, no doubt, is their primary role. But they have an important secondary role – one in which they are expected to act in a quasi-judicial manner. When functioning in that role, the Director General and his staff should be expected to act independently and free from any attempts being made to influence their decisions, except when made under conditions of open dialogue or due process.