That was the issue on the table in Prague, an issue that was defined but not agreed upon. Another issue was not addressed: Of what value is Germany to the United States today, beyond political cover, from a military standpoint? Germany, and indeed continental Europe taken together, is neither decisive nor material to the type of military operations the United States now foresees.

Even if Germany completely committed itself to the U.S. cause, the net effect would be trivial. Therefore, the U.S.-German relationship, once the pivot of the international system, has become trivial and rancorous. Its future is based more on force of habit than on geopolitical necessity.

Now consider Turkey. The United States also had a critical relationship with Turkey during the Cold War. As the Soviets probed to their southwest, looking to penetrate the Mediterranean, Turkey's control of the Bosporus was critical to the U.S. containment strategy. Maintaining a close relationship with a stable, pro-U.S. Turkey was in many ways as important to the United States as its relationship with Germany.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S.-Turkish relations went through the same process that U.S.-German relations are going through today. One part of the relationship continued through force of habit; one part searched for a new footing, albeit without any sense of urgency given that no overarching threat had emerged. The geopolitics of the current era, however, have created a very different relationship between the United States and Turkey.