transformed the emirate into a constitutional monarchy to pacify the majority Shiite population. Jordan's King Abdullah has gone the way of Egypt by actively supporting Washington's campaign against al Qaeda. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is openly allowing U.S. forces to hunt the terrorist group in his country, and Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is dismantling dynastic monopolies on imports and implementing unprecedented value-added taxes.
These reforms, measures and initiatives are meant to diffuse popular resentment. But most are little more than cosmetic. For example, the Saudi peace proposal does not have the full support of all the Arab states and isn't likely to get it, despite Riyadh's claims to the contrary. In Bahrain, the king will establish a dual parliament, one elected and one appointed, which limits the legislative power of the Shiite majority.
Since the steps taken are not decisive, they will not resolve underlying pressures in many countries. For instance, Bahrain's Shiite majority is willing to accept the concessions made by the Sunni ruling elite, but only for the moment. Once it becomes obvious that these measures are insufficient, the frustration and dissent that prompted the changes will only resurface.
Arab governments are hoping that buying time will be all that's needed to keep things from boiling over. But they may be miscalculating the level of frustration that millions of unemployed youths feel. Though military coups are the most common source of regime changes in the region, they often ride a wave of widespread social unrest. In the Arab world, such waves of protest are now on the horizon. Who takes advantage of them is the next question.
Additional analysis from STRATFOR.com can be found at: http://www.stratfor.com. This article is reprinted with permission from the publisher.
These reforms, measures and initiatives are meant to diffuse popular resentment. But most are little more than cosmetic. For example, the Saudi peace proposal does not have the full support of all the Arab states and isn't likely to get it, despite Riyadh's claims to the contrary. In Bahrain, the king will establish a dual parliament, one elected and one appointed, which limits the legislative power of the Shiite majority.
Since the steps taken are not decisive, they will not resolve underlying pressures in many countries. For instance, Bahrain's Shiite majority is willing to accept the concessions made by the Sunni ruling elite, but only for the moment. Once it becomes obvious that these measures are insufficient, the frustration and dissent that prompted the changes will only resurface.
Arab governments are hoping that buying time will be all that's needed to keep things from boiling over. But they may be miscalculating the level of frustration that millions of unemployed youths feel. Though military coups are the most common source of regime changes in the region, they often ride a wave of widespread social unrest. In the Arab world, such waves of protest are now on the horizon. Who takes advantage of them is the next question.
Additional analysis from STRATFOR.com can be found at: http://www.stratfor.com. This article is reprinted with permission from the publisher.