Cuba appears to be just a pawn in a wider strategy, despite the administration's efforts to paint Castro as a real threat. Cuba certainly didn't make the list purely on its own merits, for there is little evidence that it represents an immediate or expanded threat. In its global survey of WMD, the Federation of American Scientists states that Cuba does not possess nuclear or chemical weapons, nor are there credible reports of Havana's efforts to acquire them. The FAS notes that "Cuba is generally regarded as having a program of research on biological warfare agents, though the scope and focus of this effort remains obscure and controversial."
Furthermore, the Bush administration has acknowledged the limited scope of the threat. Speaking May 6 to the Heritage Foundation, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said the United States believes Cuba has "at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort." This belief is nothing new, and no new evidence yet has been made public that makes the threat of Cuba's production or distribution of biological agents to rogue nations any more immediate.
The Bush administration has learned that vague threats can be effective, especially at home, but that such threats also need a visible face. That makes launching a primarily faceless war against terrorism exceedingly difficult. Even with Osama bin Laden, the U.S. public eventually will lose its fear of the stateless and amorphous al Qaeda, especially if it fails to attack again soon. How convenient then to call on the usual suspects -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi -- to shore up domestic support for the war. And who, after all, is more convenient -- more usual -- than Fidel Castro?
Additional analysis from STRATFOR.com can be found in our LINKS section or at:
http://www.stratfor.com .
This article is reprinted with permission from the publisher.
Furthermore, the Bush administration has acknowledged the limited scope of the threat. Speaking May 6 to the Heritage Foundation, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said the United States believes Cuba has "at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort." This belief is nothing new, and no new evidence yet has been made public that makes the threat of Cuba's production or distribution of biological agents to rogue nations any more immediate.
The Bush administration has learned that vague threats can be effective, especially at home, but that such threats also need a visible face. That makes launching a primarily faceless war against terrorism exceedingly difficult. Even with Osama bin Laden, the U.S. public eventually will lose its fear of the stateless and amorphous al Qaeda, especially if it fails to attack again soon. How convenient then to call on the usual suspects -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran and Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi -- to shore up domestic support for the war. And who, after all, is more convenient -- more usual -- than Fidel Castro?
Additional analysis from STRATFOR.com can be found in our LINKS section or at:
http://www.stratfor.com .
This article is reprinted with permission from the publisher.