This new political rift in South Korea has helped to tie the United States' hands when dealing with North Korea. Eager to keep the focus on Iraq, and unable to gain the support of its vital ally South Korea, the Bush administration was coaxed to lessen their negative rhetoric toward Pyongyang.

This was most dramatically seen in U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly's meeting with South Korean officials on January 13, 2003. Kelly, in response to a reporter's question at a news conference in Seoul, stated, "We know there are energy problems in North Korea. Once we get beyond the

nuclear problems, there may be an opportunity with the United States, with private investors, or with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area."

Kelly's statements mark a change in policy as previously, the Bush administration said they would not negotiate with North Korea, who they accused of blackmailing the United States. Kelly's remarks should please Pyongyang, which now has the public assurance that if they shut down their recently started reactors, the United States will help North Korea with its energy needs.

It also props up the image of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who will look even more heroic to his people by standing up to the United States. But Pyongyang cannot expect to achieve much more from their unconventional negotiating methods.

China, arguably North Korea's largest aid donor, does not stand to gain from North Korea's tough attempts to bring the United States back to the negotiating table. Beijing, eager to join the world community and increase financial investment, does not want to become a fait accomplice in Pyongyang's orchestrated nuclear threats. This could ally both South Korea and Japan even more closely with the United States, isolating China.