The U.S. State Department notes: "The United States is the largest foreign investor in Georgia, annually contributing between 20%-34% of overall FDI (foreign direct investment) in recent years. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz gas pipeline will offer opportunities for investors in the energy sector as well as related infrastructure. Additional privatization is planned in the energy sector, including power distribution outside of Tbilisi and hydropower facilities."
Some speculate that the coziness between Washington and Shevardnadze dates to the fall of the Soviet Union when he played a key role as Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign minister. Whatever the reason, the U.S. has provided Georgia with $1.2 billion in assistance between spring '91, when they declared their independence, and 2001.
Because of this, Moscow fears Georgia, and neighboring Azerbaijan for that matter, becoming too Westernized. The Russian economy is suffering and Moscow wants to stop the flow of money out of the region, largely going to the U.S. and Europe, while attracting more direct foreign investment than Georgia.
Putin is also not keen on quickly being surrounded by client states heavily funded and invested in by his country's former nemesis and the leading economic power; in a sense, it has become a game of influence. The more U.S./E.U./WorldBank/ International Monetary Fund influence continues to saturate the area, the more of the region's riches and loyalties elude Moscow's grasp and economic benefit.
Some speculate that the coziness between Washington and Shevardnadze dates to the fall of the Soviet Union when he played a key role as Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign minister. Whatever the reason, the U.S. has provided Georgia with $1.2 billion in assistance between spring '91, when they declared their independence, and 2001.
Because of this, Moscow fears Georgia, and neighboring Azerbaijan for that matter, becoming too Westernized. The Russian economy is suffering and Moscow wants to stop the flow of money out of the region, largely going to the U.S. and Europe, while attracting more direct foreign investment than Georgia.
Putin is also not keen on quickly being surrounded by client states heavily funded and invested in by his country's former nemesis and the leading economic power; in a sense, it has become a game of influence. The more U.S./E.U./WorldBank/ International Monetary Fund influence continues to saturate the area, the more of the region's riches and loyalties elude Moscow's grasp and economic benefit.