Acting on his information, the United States launched an operation March 2 against what Zadran apparently reported was a group of 150 al Qaeda fighters hiding 60 miles south of Gardez. U.S. officials did not realize that enemy forces in the area were actually much larger and that al Qaeda represented only a fraction of those fighters. Most -- and in fact, the command -- were Taliban forces. Saifur Rahman, a young Taliban commander who is related to a respected Afghan mujahideen and tribal leader, has led the battle against the United States in recent days. His fighters, all locals with several years of guerrilla experience and intimate familiarity with the region, launched surprise attacks on allied forces. Rahman was behind the first ambush of about 100 U.S. troops on March 2 in which a U.S. soldier was killed.

The fact that Afghan guerrilla war veterans command and comprise the bulk of anti-U.S. forces in the region is the main reason the operation did not go as planned and the United States suffered its heaviest losses so far in Afghanistan. Consider that all U.S. helicopters engaged in Operation Anaconda were struck the very first day, with one downed and five disabled, as U.S. forces acknowledge.

Taliban fighters did not have surface-to-air missiles; all choppers were hit by small-arms fire and grenade launchers. This level of marksmanship, using inferior weapons, could be developed only through years of guerrilla warfare in the same mountains where the battle now is being fought. It is local Taliban fighters, not al Qaeda, who have mastered such skills and who fought guerrilla war at high altitudes during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Ambushes such as that of six U.S. soldiers, who were killed just after landing March 2, were frequent in the 1980s.