MACHO PRESIDENTS
How can we explain this presidential drive? The reasons are many but we can note a prominent few. As the power of the United States grew, so did the military power available to presidents. As philosophers have long observed, power tends to corrupt those entrusted with it. While this rule has commonly applied to despots, few American presidents have been exceptions to it. Even in a democracy in times of real or feigned crises rarely have they been able to transcend the macho impulse, in large part because military swagger, when successful, brings rewards from a public that has always admired it.
The media, presidential cultists, pundits, and even journalists and academics who termed themselves presidential historians, all praised executive activism in foreign policy. Congress, too, abetted the growth of the presidential war power by abdicating its constitutional mandate to keep that power to itself. Usually fearful of bucking a popular president, of appearing unpatriotic, or of retribution at the ballot box, legislators have gone along with executive war making. In the case of the second Bush, this lack of congressional spine appears to legitimate his appetite for war. So does the failure of legislators to question the morality of his stance.
How can we explain this presidential drive? The reasons are many but we can note a prominent few. As the power of the United States grew, so did the military power available to presidents. As philosophers have long observed, power tends to corrupt those entrusted with it. While this rule has commonly applied to despots, few American presidents have been exceptions to it. Even in a democracy in times of real or feigned crises rarely have they been able to transcend the macho impulse, in large part because military swagger, when successful, brings rewards from a public that has always admired it.
The media, presidential cultists, pundits, and even journalists and academics who termed themselves presidential historians, all praised executive activism in foreign policy. Congress, too, abetted the growth of the presidential war power by abdicating its constitutional mandate to keep that power to itself. Usually fearful of bucking a popular president, of appearing unpatriotic, or of retribution at the ballot box, legislators have gone along with executive war making. In the case of the second Bush, this lack of congressional spine appears to legitimate his appetite for war. So does the failure of legislators to question the morality of his stance.